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The purpose of the paper is to highlight some essential features of an approach to
the resolution of international financial crises, based upon an assessment of what
has been essential for restoring normal relations between debtors and creditors in
recent crises. We focus on the nexus between the debtor and the private creditors
and on what they can do together to solve the collective action problems that
bedevil the resolution of crises, recognising that the official sector has a catalytic
role to play. This contrasts with the emphasis on the relationship between the
official sector and the debtor, and on the connection between the official sector
and the private sector. The essence of a lasting solution is finding practical ways
to enable debtors and creditors to conclude and implement explicit and implicit
agreements relating to the amount and timing of credit flows and debt repayments.
1  The authors are, respectively, Governor and Deputy Governor for International Affairs at the Central
Bank of Brazil.  Gavin Bingham provided the inspiration for, and many of the central ideas in, this essay.
Peter Kenen, Mervyn King, Daniel Marx, John Murray, Ted Truman and Whitney Debevoise all provided
insightful comments and penetrating observations. We alone, however, are responsible for the
conclusions and proposals.4
,QWURGXFWLRQ
The prospect of recurrent and uncontrolled financial crises is one of the gravest
threats to an open and liberal international economic order. The crisis that started
in Asia in 1997 and then spread to Russia and Brazil led to sharp declines in
income, widespread unemployment and, in some countries, significant changes in
the political order, culminating in the most severe international financial crisis in
sixty years. Recent events in Turkey and Argentina demonstrate that financial
crises with potentially profound consequences for economic and political stability
are not a thing of the past. They also demonstrate the continued urgency of finding
practical and concrete means to handle the crises that do occur.
This is not to belittle the progress that has been made so far. In the years since the
outbreak of the Asian crisis a broad consensus has been developed within the
international community on the basic elements of international crisis management.
The bulk of the advancements achieved, however, lie in the realm of crisis
prevention, where there is widespread acceptance of the need to maintain sound
macroeconomic fundamentals and to adopt best practice standards in several areas
including financial supervision and regulation, data dissemination and overall
policy transparency, debt management, corporate governance, accounting,
auditing, etc.
Less agreement has been reached in the area of crisis resolution. There is
considerable understanding of the need for clarity in the way in which the
international community will respond in different conditions and recognition that
the response will have to vary depending on the circumstances of the country and
the world economy. But this broad accord masks disagreement on the concrete
actions that should be taken in the event of a crisis. One school contends that a
discretionary response to future crises will achieve a superior outcome because it
will allow actions to be tailored to the factors causing the crisis and the
circumstances in which it occurs. By contrast, the second school stresses the
importance of clear limits on the amounts of official financing and reliance on
alternative instruments such as standstills to deal with payments crises.5
The differences of view between the two schools do not arise primarily from
disagreement about the importance of promoting efficiency and stability in
financial markets or other related economic issues. Nor do they arise from
difference in objectives. Both camps desire to improve the pricing of risk and the
predictability of outcomes. Both recognise the importance of keying action off the
achievement of medium-term debt sustainability. And both acknowledge the
importance of containing contagion.
The differences in views have their origins in two factors. One is discontent with
how discretion is currently exercised. The second is a difference of view about the
nature of the market imperfections that require public action and how best to
contend with the risks associated with moral hazard. One school is convinced that
vicious circles, herding and contagion are a serious threat to international financial
stability. They recognise the costs associated with providing public finance when
a crisis occurs, but they think that the benefits from avoiding a “bad equilibrium”
outweigh the costs. They do not think that it will ever be possible to set out a
mechanical rule that will deal with all the instances of multiple equilibria, and
they feel that the central bankers’ tried and true rule of “constructive ambiguity”
will be adequate for addressing the problem of creditor moral hazard.
2 They note
that Russia was widely regarded as “too nuclear to fail”, yet the international
community declined to make additional funds available in autumn 1998. This,
more than any official pronouncement, has greatly reduced moral hazard.
The second school stresses the longer-term distortions in the allocation of capital
and the pricing of risk that can arise when creditors expect that debtors will be
able to obtain funds to cope with a serious international financial crisis. They
acknowledge that a case can be made for providing emergency assistance in
certain, very rare circumstances, but contend that the repeated provision of finance
2  Both of the schools agree that creditor moral hazard is of greater concern than debtor moral hazard.
Debtors are already enduring considerable pain when they find themselves unable to repay their debt. It is
highly unlikely that they will “cut off their noses to spite their faces”. However, creditors are more likely
to lend without thorough credit analyses if they have reason to expect that they will receive compensation
in the event that the debtor cannot or does not pay.6
shapes expectations and alters “the rules of the game”. In their view the
succession of financial crises that the world has experienced can be attributed to
the prospect that official money will be made available in the event of a crisis,
leading to excessively cheap finance. Lower than warranted interest rates have
prompted greater and sometimes excessive lending. In their view the best way to
ensure that risk is adequately priced is to introduce strict limits on official
funding, and exceed them in only the most exceptional circumstances. Increased
predictability will promote more accurate pricing.
There are other reasons for wanting to limit reliance on large-scale official
financial assistance. Some argue that, even in a clear-cut liquidity case, big
packages may not be large enough by themselves to restore confidence. This is
because the need for tranching to enforce conditionality raises uncertainty about
the amount of money available up front. An additional consideration is the
tendency for large-scale official financing to produce unequal treatment, to the
extent that big problems (countries) get big packages and small problems
(countries) get small packages. Small countries will then be forced to implement
more draconian adjustment policies and/or to rely to a greater extent on
potentially more costly private sector financing, even when they face liquidity
problems rather than solvency problems.
Despite these differences, all sides acknowledge the need to add more structure to
the debate. In practice, the problem has been framed as one about the amount of
private sector involvement (PSI) that is needed or recommended in a crisis.
Recent discussion of PSI already indicates a degree of convergence, one side
arguing for constrained discretion, the other for flexible rules.
The purpose of this note is to highlight some essential features of an approach to
crisis resolution, drawn from an assessment of what has been essential for
restoring normal relations between debtors and creditors in recent crises. We
focus on the QH[XVEHWZHHQWKHGHEWRUDQGWKHSULYDWHFUHGLWRUVand on what they
can do together to solve the collective action problems that bedevil the resolution
of crises, UHFRJQLVLQJWKDWWKHRIILFLDOVHFWRUKDVDFDWDO\WLFUROHWRSOD\. This
contrasts with the emphasis on the relationship EHWZHHQWKHRIILFLDOVHFWRUDQGWKH7
GHEWRU, and on the connection EHWZHHQWKHRIILFLDOVHFWRUDQGWKHSULYDWHVHFWRU
that are the defining features of the two views mentioned above.
Our premise is that sustainability of a country’s policies is the outcome of a
complex intertemporal game involving the sovereign debtor, a shifting pool of
varied investors and the official international community. These various actors
have partially congruent and partially divergent interests. Success is dependent on
finding ways to allow the several parties to co-operate. Without such cooperation,
conditions can deteriorate rapidly and a crisis erupt. This is particularly the case
where financing is provided mainly in the form of marketable securities which are
held and traded by well-capitalised intermediaries and final investors. At times co-
operation can be achieved by making the structure of the game and its risks and
rewards explicit. In some instances, however, co-ordination might require
changing the structure and/or the pay-offs of the underlying game. The official
sector should be the first to move, operating as a catalyst, HYHQZKHQLWVPRYHLV
PHUHO\WKHFRQILUPDWLRQWKDWLWZLOOQRWSURYLGHILQDQFLQJ. However, the essence
of a lasting solution is finding practical ways to enable debtors and creditors to
conclude and implement explicit and implicit agreements relating to the amount
and timing of credit flows and debt repayments.
An essential element is the creation of an appropriate array of incentives and ex-
ante understandings or contractual arrangements that eliminate the risk of market
discontinuities when unexpected events occur. A common feature of many of the
proposals is the provision of greater certainty about the actions that could be
undertaken when a crisis occurs.
Such proposals include
-  Wider use of collective action clauses and/or exit consents
-  More extensive use of contingent financing arrangements from commercial
banks that could be drawn on in times of difficulty
-  Embedding call options in interbank lines that provide a contractual basis for
an extension of maturities8
-  Use of structured bonds that link payment to economic developments
Success in finding a unique set of required steps is complicated by the diverse
nature of financial crises. Financial crises occur and then spread from one country
to another for a multitude of reasons. In some cases the cause is a common
external shock as, for example, when commodity and/or energy prices move
unexpectedly or when global interest rates or exchange rates among the three
major currency blocks shift unpredictably. In other cases it may be because of a
shift in investors’ risk appetite, as occurred in October 1998, when risk premia on
first class assets with little default risk increased perceptibly, and then affected
rates across the whole spectrum of financial assets.
One common challenge present in most cases has been the need to foster dialogue
among the main sets of actors and, more particularly, to find a way to secure
coordination among members of the same class of actors, especially creditors.
6L[ILQDQFLDOFULVHV
In order to understand what has worked in practice, we consider the ways in
which sovereign debtors and private creditors have sought and found a resolution
in six separate cases: Brazil, Ecuador, Korea, Pakistan, Russia and Ukraine.
3
The six cases differ considerably with respect to the size of the country, the nature
and amount of the debt involved, the speed with which the problem was resolved,
the amount of official financing made available, and the extent to which it was
necessary to alter the nominal value and/or discounted present value of the debt.
Yet these six episodes provide important insights into how to address four related
issues: (i) determining the amount and nature of the debt that needs to be
3  Two other cases have been omitted. One is Romania, which continued to service its private sector debt by
making radical adjustments in its trade flows despite a provision in its Letter of Intent that implied
negotiations with private creditors. The other is Indonesia where the focus of the initial debt work out
process was on private debt owed to private creditors, though some of the subsequent negotiations
involved the Indonesian authorities. Argentina and Turkey are omitted because they are so recent.9
reprofiled, (ii) structuring negotiations between the debtor and creditors, (iii)
procedural choices and (iv) dealing with inter-creditor equity issues.
In all of the cases, there were three sets of actors whose actions shaped the
outcome: (i) the authorities in the debtor country, (ii) the private creditors and (iii)
the official community acting through the IMF and other multilateral institutions.
The behaviour of these three sets of actors can best be understood in terms of their
principal objectives:
·  For the debtor, the immediate objective in many cases is to retain or regain
market access quickly and on VXVWDLQDEOH WHUPV. In order to do this, the
debtor will first need to establish a sustainable debt profile, taking into
account the socio-economic costs associated with macroeconomic adjustment
(unemployment, poverty and bankruptcies) and the maintenance of sufficient
political support to remain in power. Unsustainable solutions sow the seeds of
new rounds and are, by definition, self-defeating.
·  For the private creditors, the objective is to maximise the value of existing and
potential claims on the debtor.
·  For the official community the key objectives are to foster the recovery of
crisis stricken countries, in ways consistent with the continued smooth
operation of the international capital market. This often involves facilitating
the upturn and mitigating pain in the country in crisis, but doing so in ways
that do not introduce systemic distortions through the creation of creditor or
debtor moral hazard. Governments also have a responsibility to see that their
taxpayers’ funds are used prudently when official money is made available to
assist a country in crisis.
'HWHUPLQLQJWKHQDWXUHDQGDPRXQWRIWKHGHEWWREHUROOHGRYHU
UHQHJRWLDWHGRUUHVWUXFWXUHG
The first step in the sequential game is to determine how much official money will
be made available. Only then will it be possible to determine the nature and extent10
of required PSI. Here we follow the framework set forth in the IMFC’s
communiqué of April 16, 2000:
“14. In some cases, the combination of catalytic official financing and policy
adjustment should allow the country to regain full market access quickly. In some
cases, emphasis should be placed on encouraging voluntary approaches, as
needed, to overcome creditor coordination problems. In other cases, the early
restoration of full market access on terms consistent with medium-term external
sustainability may be judged unrealistic, and a broader spectrum of actions by
private sector creditors, including comprehensive debt restructuring, may be
warranted to provide for an adequately financed program and a viable medium-
term payments profile.”
Whatever the outcome of such an exercise, private sector financing will in general
be necessary and desirable. Necessary because official finance will often not
suffice to meet the needs of the debtor if the crisis is serious. And desirable
because it is inappropriate for the official sector to crowd out the private sector in
the provision of finance. The only question – but a crucial one - is how it is to be
arranged. The total amount of finance needed from the private sector is
endogenous. It will depend on the resources available to the debtor and the size
and timing of its payment obligations coming due. These in turn depend on the
maturity and currency composition of its liabilities as well as on the amount of
funds provided by the international community. They also depend on the extent to
which adjustment is permitted to take place through exchange rate movements and
the extent of GHIDFWR capital account convertibility.
4
In the case of Korea, interbank claims constituted a significant proportion of total
liabilities. They were rolled over through targeted negotiations with a small
number of bank creditors. Similarly, Brazil´s interbank credits were rolled over
within the context of a monitoring program put in place as the country addressed
4     Where capital account convertibility is not full, what matters is the efficacy of capital controls.11
its fiscal problems and let its currency float. By contrast, in the other four cases
the importance of bonds in total debt meant that no meaningful solution could be
found without including these liabilities in the negotiations.
In many instances, serious discussions between the debtor and its creditors do not
begin until an adjustment program has been agreed with the IMF and there is a
measure of clarity about the amount of financing that will be provided by the
official sector. For example, negotiations between bank creditors and both Korea
and Brazil on the rollover of exposures began in earnest only after the size of
official commitments was known. Similarly, although Ecuador announced in
August 1999 that it would interrupt payments on its Brady and Euro bonds,
discussions on an exchange offer tended to become meaningful only after the
signing of a letter of intent in April 2000. However, debtors and creditors do on
occasion reach agreement in the absence of a Fund program. For example,
Ukraine’s 2000 bond exchange took place without an IMF program.
The increase in the importance of bonds as a source of finance for emerging
market economies has made the inclusion of these instruments in debt
restructurings unavoidable. The Russian default in August 1998 demonstrated that
an unexpected cessation of service on debt instruments, domestic or foreign, by a
systemically significant country can lead to a large and undifferentiated increase
in emerging market spreads and reduced market access. The de-leveraging process
that ensued was analogous to a bank run. Recent episodes involving bonds have
been more salutary. They suggest that bonds can be included in debt workouts
without necessarily having significant adverse consequences for the market.
Indeed, access by creditworthy borrowers improved during the period in which
Pakistan, Ukraine and Ecuador were negotiating the bond workouts (although
spreads increased significantly at the time of the Ecuadorian “restructuring”).
Moreover, compared to the second half of 1998, investors have more recently
shown an enhanced capacity to differentiate among emerging market borrowers
and have not shunned the entire asset class because of default by some borrowers.
The greater prudence shown by investors has meant that funds are not always12
readily available on the same terms as in the past. Nonetheless, creditworthy
borrowers from emerging markets are able to access the market.
6WUXFWXULQJGLDORJXHEHWZHHQWKHGHEWRUDQGFUHGLWRUV
Dialogue between creditors and debtors has always been an essential feature of
crisis resolution. However, the changes that have occurred in the pattern of
financing over the past decade have made it more important than ever by radically
altering the dynamics of the relationship between creditors and debtors. Today,
financing takes a variety of forms, and it is provided by a range of different
creditors who have divergent objectives and interests. Tradable securities have
become more important. Moreover, ultimate investors and financial
intermediaries, who tend to be better capitalised than in the past, often place only
a small part of their large portfolios in any asset class. The establishment and
maintenance of long-term relationships is less important for these market
participants who have fiduciary responsibilities to their stakeholders. By contrast,
the opening of the banking markets in many emerging markets to foreign
investors mean that international banks often have a strategic long term interest in
the country. Even though the bulk of their lending may be short-term interbank
claims, their interests may sometimes be longer term.
The nature of the interaction between the debtor and private creditors has varied
considerably across the six cases. In some, the provision of continuous
information by the debtor helped to promote understanding of the debtor’s
circumstances (Brazil). In others the debtor engaged in explicit negotiations on the
terms of a rollover and/or restructuring with a limited number of market
participants (Korea, Russia). In still others, the debtor did not negotiate with
representatives of the creditors but instead made an exchange offer prepared in
consultation with advisers familiar with the emerging country debt market. In
cases where the debt is issued in negotiable form and widely held, informal
consultation between debtors and their creditors leading to exchange offers has
become common. The reasons for this are:13
·  Assembling an appropriate set of creditor representatives is difficult when the
community of creditors is diffuse and heterogeneous.
·  Debtors recognise that creditors, once organised, may seek their own
remedies.
·  The emergence of a secondary market helps those who craft an exchange offer
to determine terms and conditions that will be acceptable to a large proportion
of the creditors without prolonged and complex negotiations. To be sure, not
all creditors mark to market and some bonds are very thinly traded so that
their price may not accurately reflect expectations. Nonetheless, once a bond
trades at distress levels, exchanges seem to be easier. Most of the recent offers
have entailed substantial marked to market gains for those who acquired bonds
at distress prices.
·  Conducting confidential negotiations with a subset of creditors creates
problems of insider information that may be avoided when an exchange offer
is made.
·  Compared with the early 1980s most creditors are better able to bear the losses
associated with debt exchanges, which can therefore take place more quickly.
5ROORYHUVVWDQGVWLOOVDQGPRUDWRULD
Inability to meet the original terms of the debt contract on time and in full is a
defining feature of financial crises. Typically, the resolution of the crisis involves
renewing existing exposures or replacing the original contracts with ones that the
debtor can be expected to meet in time and in full, though it is also possible to
adjust the terms on existing contracts.
Existing contracts may be rolled over or a new contract may be substituted for an
existing one through negotiation or an exchange offer while the old one is being
serviced, as was the case with Korea, Brazil and Pakistan. However, in other cases
delays in payment or the accumulation of arrears occur before a new profile of14
payments can be agreed. For instance, both Russia and Ukraine stopped making
debt payments at certain stages and imposed exchange controls.
Falling into arrears or arranging a standstill
5 will provide a debtor with transitory
relief. However, such an event of default opens the way for the creditor (or for one
or more classes of creditors if there are cross default clauses) to seek legal
remedy. Despite the occurrence of an event of default, creditors may, and often
do, agree implicitly or explicitly to a temporary stay on litigation while a solution
is sought. In some cases the contract may provide for a grace period and the
debtor can seek to regularise his payments during this period. Even without such
provisions, creditors may delay seeking legal redress, thus providing the debtor
with some respite. Creditors sometimes refrain from taking legal action
immediately because they are convinced that the debtor is genuinely seeking a
sustainable solution. Or it may be because the costs of legal action and the time it
takes to secure and enforce a judgement make the expected value of a court award
less than the expected value of a cooperative settlement.
Actions by the official community affect these calculations. Lending into arrears
can and should be a sign that, in the view of the Fund, the debtor is making efforts
to implement a program that will raise the expected value of the outstanding debt.
Such a program may contain provisions encouraging the debtor to work with its
creditors. For example the April 2000 program for Ecuador had such provisions.
Agreement on a program also makes it clear how much official money will be
available.
In short there is a spectrum of actions for dealing with debt distress ranging from
remaining current on obligations and negotiating new money or new terms
through negotiating a temporary standstill in payments to the declaration of a
moratorium or even the complete repudiation of the debt. The decision of the
5 The  5H\ 5HSRUW distinguished between payment suspensions undertaken with the explicit or implicit
agreement of creditors (standstills) and unilateral payment suspensions by debtors (moratoria), but noted
that the boundaries can become blurred, for instance if a moratorium receives the tacit approval of
creditors.15
debtor regarding any particular course of action will be shaped - at least in part -
by the expected impact on the availability and the cost of funds in the future. The
decisions of the creditors will be shaped by the impact on the present value of
expected future receipts. The official community by its actions can influence both
sets of calculations.
'HDOLQJZLWKLQWHUFUHGLWRUHTXLW\LVVXHV
In some respects each of the three classes of actors is homogeneous. Unless the
debtor engages in selective default, the members of each class will have common
interests and share common objectives. However, the value of any individual
creditor’s claim depends not only on the capacity of the debtor to pay but also on
the actions of other creditors. If a small set of creditors succeeds in securing
preferential treatment, this will reduce the amount available for other creditors.
For this reason, credible workout arrangements must deal not only with the
interrelationship between the debtor and different classes of creditors, but also
with questions of comparability across classes and within classes.
6KRUWWHUPFUHGLWRUV
If the debt is largely short-term and greatly exceeds the foreign exchange reserves
of the country, as was the case in Korea at the end of 1997, the value of any
individual creditor’s claim depends on the willingness of other creditors to roll
over their exposures. This creates a collective action problem.
In the case of Korea it was resolved through targeted negotiations with a limited
number of large bank creditors that took place under the patronage of the
authorities in the main financial centres. The provision of guarantees by a fiscally
sound debtor government enhanced the value of the new credits. The liquidity
problem was resolved when most (but not all) bank creditors agreed to roll $22
billion in short-term exposures into longer maturity (one to three-year) claims.
To help stop the erosion of lender confidence, Brazil combined major
macroeconomic reforms (such as the adoption of a floating exchange rate regime16
and fiscal adjustment), an IMF program and coordinated bilateral financial with a
system designed to monitor the rollover of its short-term interbank credits The
system provided creditors with information on the actions and intentions of other
creditors and thus helped reduce the collective action problem. Once creditors saw
that other creditors were willing to roll over their exposures to a country that was
making serious efforts to deal with its macro-economic imbalances they became
willing to roll over theirs. Moreover, the existence of effective monitoring
arrangements meant that banks were able to understand the reasons for changes in
exposures, thereby reducing the risk of a hasty and unjustified rush for the exits at
the first sign of a decline in the rollover ratio. For example, they could
differentiate changes in exposures caused by a corporate restructuring in a
particular bank from changes that denoted a re-assessment of the risk associated
with Brazil.
In the case of both Korea and Brazil, large amounts of official money were made
available in support of adjustment programs, and the two countries remained
current on their debts while they extended their maturity or arranged rollovers. It
has been suggested that, instead of relying on official finance, these countries
could have temporarily interrupted payments on their short-term debt while they
negotiated an extension or rollover. There is no experience to assess how such an
approach would have worked, but there are clear strategic problems associated
with it. Most countries encountering payments difficulties tend to service short-
term trade-related debt because of its immediate importance for their economies.
Moreover, at any point in time long term credits will often be falling due.
Defaulting on the payment of these credits would raise questions of creditor
equity and could lead to the activation of cross default clauses. The past
experience of some countries such as Brazil suggests that a strategy based on
payments interruptions has very high and long lasting costs, ranging from loss of
access to prohibitively expensive financing costs, even if a subset of the debt is
serviced on time.17
/RQJWHUPFUHGLWRUV
Because some proportion of a country’s long-term debt is generally maturing in
any given period, the distinction between short and long term creditors cannot be
rigid. Nonetheless, successful resolution of a debt crisis involving longer-term
claims involves establishing a payment schedule that is sustainable. In most of the
recent cases the old debt has been replaced with a new contract containing new
payment terms. Creditors generally accept an exchange offer when they believe
that the relief brought by the exchange will make the debtor better able to meet his
new obligations. However, some creditors may elect to hold out in the hope that
they will be paid according to the original contract, be able to seize assets or be
“bought out” by other creditors. This raises inter-creditor equity issues and may
delay the resolution of the debt problem.
In the case of Pakistan and Ukraine, holdouts did not obstruct restructuring of
Eurobonds. The fact that some, though not all, the contracts contained qualified
majority voting provisions may have helped. In these cases, holdouts have known
that they will not be able to impede a solution acceptable to a large majority of
creditors. In Ukraine's case, majority voting provisions were used to bind holdout
creditors. In the case of Pakistan, the majority amendment provisions were not
used, but the presence of a trustee meant that no individual holder could initiate
litigation unless he held 25% of the outstanding amount of the bonds. In addition
the proceeds of any litigation would have had to be shared among the creditors.
By contrast, certain creditors have sought and obtained judgements against
Russia. In these cases, the actions appear to have been motivated by the delay in
reaching settlement and payment.
2IILFLDODQGSULYDWHFUHGLWRUV
Inter-creditor equity issues also arise between official and private creditors. The
purpose of the provision of official money is to finance an adjustment program.
Properly implemented, such a program will raise the discounted present value of
existing debt. This is the economic rationale according implicit seniority to
official finance extended to finance an adjustment program. However, official18
money is fungible and can be used to delay adjustment while maintaining debt
service payments to creditors. Performance criteria and provisions that directly or
indirectly promote the re-negotiation of private debt help to alleviate this risk. For
example, the floors for reserve holdings that were set in the case of Ukraine meant
that the country had to seek accommodation from its creditors in 1998 and 1999.
A provision in the Paris Club rescheduling agreement for Pakistan called for the
inclusion of Eurobonds in the re-negotiation of private debt.
&KURQLFGHEWSUREOHPV
Inter-creditor equity and coordination problems are particularly acute in cases of
protracted debt problems, where debt is rescheduled repeatedly. For example,
Russia’s London Club creditors concluded a new agreement in February 2000, six
months after an earlier Paris Club rescheduling had been concluded but before a
new rescheduling of bilateral official debt that many observers felt would be
needed. In cases where there are a series of Fund programs and repeated
reschedulings, private creditors may elect not to wait for final clarity about the
amount of official finance. They do so because they recognise that protracted
delay will greatly reduce the discounted present value of their claims. The moves
in such an ongoing game and the nature of claims for equitable treatment are
complicated by the fact that the composition of different classes changes as the
debt is traded.
Protracted debt problems also complicate the resolution process, because the rules
of the game may change as the game is being played. Indeed, some of the actions
of both the creditors and debtors may be aimed at altering the rules of the game,
thereby shifting future pay-offs.
&RQFOXVLRQ
The experience of recent crises demonstrates that creditors and debtors can work
together in ways that enable debtors to regain and retain market access on
sustainable terms and creditors to maximise the value of their present and future19
claims. This helps to reduce the risk that crises will spread to other countries. Its
key elements are:
·  $SSURSULDWHSROLFLHV Unless a country adopts a set of policies that credibly
addresses the domestic causes of the financing difficulties, it will not succeed
in inducing its creditors to co-operate. To be sure, events outside the country,
such as sudden and pervasive shifts in risk appetite, may trigger or contribute
to the crisis, and the country cannot reasonably be expected to resolve those
problems, but contagion often affects those who are weak and vulnerable. In
these cases action can and should be taken to reduce vulnerability.
·  2IILFLDO VHFWRU ILQDQFLQJ Clarity is needed about whether official sector
financing will be forthcoming and, in case the answer is positive, about the
terms and conditions on which it will be provided before serious debt
discussions take place between creditors and debtors. The key factor
determining the amount and nature of official financing should be the extent to
which policies being pursued contribute to a sustainable degree of leverage in
the economy. Sustainability will, in cases where the currency is fully
convertible, depend upon willingness of both residents and non-residents to
hold domestic currency claims. There will of course be cases where this may
not be achievable without some debt reprofiling. The more interesting
situations, however, are those where the official sector can play the catalytic
role which allows the country to move from a bad equilibrium, where creditors
run, to a good one, where creditors find it in their collective and individual
interest to maintain their exposures to the country.
·  6SHHG It is important to address payments problems quickly. Delay reduces
the net present value of creditors’ existing claims and makes it difficult or
costly for the debtor to issue new ones. Speed will also reduce the risk of
contagion and promote the continuity of markets needed to ensure accurate
pricing.
·  &RRUGLQDWLRQDQGFRPPXQLFDWLRQDPRQJFUHGLWRUV±UHVROYLQJFROOHFWLYH
DFWLRQ SUREOHPV A crisis is frequently associated with very delicate and20
finely balanced expectational dynamics that have to be handled by the official
sector with considerable care. In order to avoid the “rush for the exits”
associated with a number of recent crises, it is important to keep in mind that
creditors are as interested in the actions of other creditors as in the policies of
the authorities in the sovereign debtor. Accordingly, it is important to provide
information on creditors’ actions, intentions and motivations. The debtor and
the official sector in the creditor countries can help to corroborate the accuracy
of the information. This will reduce the incentive to free-ride on the back of
misrepresented intentions. (See box on Brazil.)
·  ,QWHUFUHGLWRUHTXLW\The outcome will be quicker and less acrimonious if
considerations of equity are born in mind. All creditors with a material
exposure need to be involved in finding a solution. However fair treatment
need not mean identical treatment. Creditors have different objective
functions, time horizons and internal discount rates. These differences need to
be taken into account.
·  (VVHQWLDOILQDQFHDQGLPSOLFLWVHQLRULW\Since it is in the interest of the
community of creditors taken together to make minimum essential finance
available to the debtor during periods of stress, there is often reason to accord
implicit seniority to certain types of debt (trade credit; official credit financing
adjustment policies). Such seniority should be confined to essential finance. It
should not in general be given to hold-out, but it may be sensible to eliminate
GHPLQLPLV claims.
·  3ULFLQJ The pricing of new or substitute forms of finance should reflect the
expected present value of the claim. In principle, markets will price the claims
accordingly, but in practice they do not always do so because of insufficient
information and thin trading. Ambiguities in the regulatory treatment of some
types of instrument like global bonds can also hamper pricing.
·  3URFHGXUHV The three sets of actors need to address the following issues in
order to reach a rapid, sustainable and fair outcome. Because each crisis is
different, it would not be feasible or desirable to use identical procedures in all21
cases. Nonetheless, having a non-exhaustive list of options describing
procedures that have worked in the past will expedite crisis resolution. Among
the issues on that list are:
&UHGLWRUUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ Is it needed? If so, how should it be structured;
3URYLVLRQRIGHEWRULQIRUPDWLRQ.  How should information from the debtor to
the creditors be provided (publicly, through agent banks in key markets,
through a creditors’ committee)? How can it be obtained if the debtor does not
have in place a comprehensive debt monitoring program without creating the
fear among investors that it is the prelude to the imposition of capital controls?
How can debtor information best be verified (through IMF releases; through
creditor data sources)? How can the problem of privileged information be dealt
with?
3URYLVLRQRIFUHGLWRULQIRUPDWLRQ. How should information about the actions
and intentions of creditors be provided to other creditors (by the official
community or by agent banks in key markets)? How can it be obtained and
verified, particularly if the debtor does not already have a reporting system in
place? If there is some form of commitment to roll-over exposures, what
information is needed to ensure that the creditor is not “shorting” the country in
some other way? How can the debtor’s ongoing market intelligence be used to
best advantage?
3DULV&OXELQIRUPDWLRQ  What types of information should be provided, to
whom and when?
3ULRULW\ILQDQFLQJ. How can essential financing be arranged, and what implicit
or explicit seniority should it have?
+ROGRXWFUHGLWRUV What actions should debtors and other creditors take in
the event that a minority of creditors decline to participate?22
6WDQGIDVW DJUHHPHQWV (informal, non-binding understandings that sets of
creditors will roll over exposures for a set time). Is there a need for them? How
long should they last? In what conditions should they be allowed to lapse?
$QQH[%UD]LO¶VH[SHULHQFHZLWKFUHGLWRUFRRUGLQDWLRQ
Brazil’s experience dealing with the creditor co-ordination problem is
instructive. Very early in its debt negotiations, it realised the importance of
demonstrating to individual creditors that other creditors were prepared to roll
over their exposures. In the road shows undertaken in late 1998 to explain the
country’s policies, creditor after creditor expressed concerns about what other
creditors would do. The story was always the same. While the speakers
themselves were confident that Brazil’s policies would enable the country to
service its debts, they were suspicious that other creditors would “rush for the
exits”.
Brazil’s strategy was to show to its creditors that the country’s adjustment
efforts together with the financial support being provided by the international
official sector would allow a transition to an over-financed balance of payments
in case they opted to maintain their exposures to the country. Given that their
returns would be higher in this scenario, it would be rational for creditors to
voluntarily roll-over their exposures.
The main challenge was to demonstrate to individual creditors that other
creditors would maintain their lines. Brazil met this challenge by adopting a
focused communications policy. It continued to explain its policies to its
creditors. It also designated a single, well-respected private financial institution
as its “focal point” in each of the main financial centres. The task of the focal
point was to disseminate information collected by the Brazilian authorities
about the overall foreign exposure to Brazil, as well as the rollover performance23
of institutions based in other financial centres. By providing a means to
demonstrate to banks in, say, London that banks in the other major centres were
prepared to renew their lines, they resolved the “prisoner’s dilemma”. Armed
with information about what other banks were doing, banks were prepared to
make an informal undertaking to stand behind Brazil and roll over their
exposures.
The Brazilians respected the confidentiality of bank-by-bank information by
communicating the rollover data centre by centre rather than institution by
institution. However, it also sought to explain the reasons for individual
institution’s actions. For example, mergers and acquisitions led to changes in
some institutions’ overall investment strategies. Such changes in broad strategy
may affect the propensity to hold emerging market debt in general. It was
important to demonstrate to other creditors that any change in willingness to
hold Brazilian debt was the result of exogenous factors, not a sign of lack of
confidence in Brazil’s performance or prospects.
Co-operation with the authorities in the main financial centres was also
important. Their interest in developments in a country in crisis stems from their
overall concern about systemic stability and their interest in the health of the
financial institutions that they supervise. In several centres the meetings
between the Brazilian authorities and the main creditor institutions were hosted
by the local central bank which took an active role in explaining to its financial
institutions the logic behind the approach being proposed. Moreover, the
authorities in the main financial centres also collected and disseminated
information on creditor exposure and held regular conference calls among
themselves to exchange information. The Brazilian authorities joined these calls
and helped to provide information on their policies and to reconcile debtor and
creditor information on rollovers.
The success of the Brazilian’s efforts to resolve the creditor co-ordination
problem can be attributed to: (1) an effective debt monitoring program, (2) the
use of “focal points” in key financial centres to communicate information about24
other creditors, (3) the assistance provided by the official sector in the main
creditor countries, as well as the international official sector, in supporting the
initiative and helping disseminate the systemic as well as individual advantages
of a voluntary and coordinated approach, (4) the nature of its counterparties,
which had an interest in a longer term relation despite extending short term
credit, and of course (5) the sustained pursuit of policies that made the country
creditworthy.
One should not, however, underestimate the difficulties involved. The data
requirements are enormous. Parties in all transactions have to be clearly
identified, imposing very high demands on information. Creditor and debtor
data are difficult to reconcile, opening the door to differences in interpretation
of underlying behaviour. The surveillance exercise has to be undertaken on a
very high frequency, so as to capture changes in behaviour early on, imposing a
very high demand on resources. Finally, the nature of the credit subject to the
voluntary exposure maintenance understanding  is key in determining whether
the system of monitoring and disseminating information is an appropriate way
to tackle the free-rider problem.25
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